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Cooperating to Commercialize Technology: A Dynamic Model of 
Fairness Perceptions, Experience, and Cooperation 
 
Abstract 
Technology entrepreneurship is an important driver of economic growth, though 
entrepreneurs must maintain cooperative ties with the owners of any technology they hope to 
bring to market. Existing studies show that fairness perceptions have a great influence on this 
cooperation, but no research investigates its precise mechanisms or dynamic patterns. This 
study explores the development of 17 ventures that cooperated with a university-owner of 
technology and thereby identifies different cooperation patterns in which fairness perceptions 
influence the degree of cooperation. These perceptions also change over time, partly as a 
function of accumulated experience and learning. A system dynamics model integrates 
insights from existing literature with the empirical findings to reveal which cooperation 
mechanisms relate to venture development over time; the combinations of individual 
experience, fairness perceptions, and market circumstances lead to four different patterns. 
This model can explain changes in entrepreneurial cooperation as a result of changes in 
fairness perceptions, which depend on learning effects and entrepreneurial experience. Each 
identified cooperation pattern thus has implications for research and offers insights for 
practitioners who need to manage relationships in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Efforts to commercialize university-based inventions encourage economic growth, because 
technology ventures enjoy a good likelihood of evolving into high growth firms (Mueller 
2006, Shane 2004). For the entrepreneurs who bring such a technology to market, 
cooperating with the university is key to ensure their venture development, sustainability, and 
competitive advantage (Rothaermel and Thursby 2005, Shane 2002), especially when those 
universities provide crucial resources such as property rights, human capital, offices, lab 
facilities, or funding. Existing research describes antecedents and outcomes of cooperation 
and demonstrates that contractual and governance forms matter (Alvarez and Parker 2009, 
Reuer et al. 2006), even if subjective factors, such as fairness perceptions, appear even more 
important (Husted and Folger 2004, Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996, Sommer and Loch 2009, 
Van Burg et al. in press). Yet we still lack insight in the dynamics of cooperative 
relationships between resource owners (e.g., universities) and entrepreneurs (Ariño and De la 
Torre 1998, Ariño et al. 2008, Ness 2009). As entrepreneurial cooperative relationships 
unfold over time, external events can affect interactions and fairness perceptions, especially 
as the parties accumulate new experiences and learn new behavior. Therefore, studying 
cooperation as dynamic behavior over time is vital for understanding entrepreneurial 
cooperation and the interventions that can overcome the limitations of standardized 
procedures that tend to break down in this context (Shane 2004, Sommer and Loch 2009).  
 This study investigates cooperation between entrepreneurs and a university where they 
acquired the intellectual property of the technological invention they hope to exploit. The 
resulting university spin-offs are key mechanisms for commercializing university-owned 
technologies (Bercovitz and Feldman 2006) and realizing economic growth (Mueller 2006), 
in which context the university usually provides resources to start the venture, acquire 
intellectual property rights, develop the technology, and obtain access to facilities. In such 
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alliances, fairness perceptions significantly influence the cooperation between the 
entrepreneurs and the university, yet no research investigates the precise mechanisms and 
different patterns of their cooperative dynamics (Ambos et al. 2008, Feldman et al. 2002, 
Rappert et al. 1999).  
 We adopt a process perspective and investigate which feedback and causal mechanisms 
determine how fairness perceptions affect this form of cooperation. Our conceptualization of 
the process is grounded in an in-depth literature review; we then gather empirical 
observations of 17 spin-off ventures. In turn, we can identify several cooperation patterns, 
including some counterintuitive patterns in which perceptions of unfairness shift to a sense of 
fairness, or vice versa, resulting in either cooperative or uncooperative behavior that has 
serious performance implications. We propose a system dynamics (SD) model of the 
feedback mechanisms and reinforcing causal loops. As its center, this model highlights how 
changing fairness perceptions drive more cooperation, particularly with the accumulation of 
experience that results in new behaviors and adjusted perceptions. In contrast, if learning is 
prevented, the relationship appears increasingly unfair, cooperation deteriorates, and venture 
development gets delayed. Our study specifies the influential functions of experience, 
fairness perceptions, and cooperation for technology commercialization. We also model 
possible interventions in deteriorating cooperation patterns, showing that involving 
experienced entrepreneurs early in the commercialization process may turn uncooperative 
behavior into more productive interactions. 
2. Fairness Perceptions and Entrepreneurial Cooperation 
2.1. Need for Cooperation  
When new ventures exploit university-owned technology, their relationship with the 
university is vital. Shane (2002) shows that university-owned inventions tend to be 
embryonic and highly innovative, such that the inventor’s cooperation for further 
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development is crucial for commercialization. The inventor might serve as the lead 
entrepreneur or member of venture team in a technology spin-off, though in some cases, the 
inventor has just an informal position in a venture run by an external entrepreneur (Franklin 
et al. 2001). Regardless of the inventor’s exact position, the venture must cooperate closely 
with his or her source university, to support the sharing of tacit knowledge about the research 
that led to the invention and to develop follow-up products (Jensen and Thursby 2001).  
 Academic entrepreneurs also usually must enter into a formal relationship with the 
university to acquire financial resources and ensure intellectual property (IP) protection (e.g., 
an exclusive license from the university). A formal relationship also enhances the credibility 
of the venture. Accordingly, research shows that more cooperative and formal venture–
university relationships exert positive influences on new venture performance (Rothaermel 
and Thursby 2005, Vohora et al. 2004), result in more innovative output at lower costs 
(George et al. 2002), and lead to faster new venture establishment (Müller 2010).   
2.2. The Crucial Role of Fairness  
After deciding to exploit a particular university-owned technology through a new venture, 
academic entrepreneurs must negotiate with the university to acquire the IP rights (usually 
with a license) and design the revenue sharing, because in most countries, the technology will 
be owned by the university (Stevens and Bagby 2001). The stressful bargaining process can 
reduce entrepreneurs’ motivation and perceptions of fair treatment (Nicolaou and Birley 
2003, Rappert et al. 1999), which in turn might influence their cooperative behavior. If they 
are sufficiently upset by the negotiations, they might even terminate the cooperation or 
pursue litigation (Feldman et al. 2002). Thus the degree of cooperation largely depends on the 
degree of perceived fairness, which affects commitment, trust, and social harmony and leads 
to cooperative or uncooperative behaviors (Kim and Mauborgne 1998, Ring and Van de Ven 
1994). The degree of perceived fairness in turn depends on the surrounding conditions, 
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interactions, and outcomes in the alliance (Kumar and Nti 1998). Fairness perceptions should 
be particularly important with regard to entrepreneurs, who lack organizational commitment 
to the university and instead must be personally involved in cooperation.  
 Existing research distinguishes four fairness dimensions—distributive, procedural, 
interactional, and informational (Colquitt 2001)—though the effect of procedural fairness on 
cooperation is most frequently studied (Griffith et al. 2006, Sommer and Loch 2009). 
Increases in fairness lead to better cooperation (Amaral and Tsay 2009, Griffith et al. 2006, 
Sommer and Loch 2009) and better venture performance. For example, in a study of the 
cooperative relationships between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, Busenitz et al. (2004) 
find that procedural fairness (the perceived fairness of the process) relates positively to long-
term venture performance, and Sapienza and Korsgaard (1996) observe that procedural 
fairness helps explain the degree of cooperation between entrepreneurs and investors. 
Similarly, perceived fairness increases cooperation between subsidiaries and corporate 
management, resulting in higher performance (Kim and Mauborgne 1998), and in a corporate 
context, it enhances a firm’s ability to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities by increasing the 
amount and quality of knowledge sharing and learning (De Clercq et al. 2010). Thus, fairness 
perceptions influence the quality of social interactions.  
 Fairness perceptions influence human behavior especially in settings marked by unequal 
power distributions, such as when one partner has less ability to assert preferences. Fair 
treatment and procedures give weaker partners a feeling of indirect control and encourage 
them to accept even somewhat adverse outcomes (Lind and Tyler 1988, Sapienza and 
Korsgaard 1996). In contrast, perceptions of unfair treatment result in resentment and adverse 
behavior, such as sabotage or uncooperative actions, regardless of the potential for 
detrimental consequences for the venturing process (Kim and Mauborgne 1998, Pillutla and 
Murnighan 1996, Sommer and Loch 2009). 
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2.3. Cooperation as a Dynamic Process 
To gain insights into the dynamics of cooperative (entrepreneurial) relationships, Ring and 
Van de Ven (1994) conceptualize a sequence of negotiation, commitment, and execution 
stages that rely on assessments of an ongoing interaction’s efficiency and equity. By 
emphasizing both fairness and efficiency, this conceptualization balances hard (e.g., 
contracts) and soft (e.g., fairness perceptions) processes. Doz (1996) also proposes that 
cooperation depends on the initial conditions that define the tasks, interface structure, and 
expectations. Partners then cycle through a sequence of learning, reevaluation, and re-
adjustment, which enables them to evaluate the relationship’s efficiency, fairness, and 
adaptability. The reevaluation stage in particular highlights perceived fairness, cooperation 
progress, and speed and thus can result in adjustments to cooperative conditions and 
processes—whether for the better or not. For example, if early expectations indicated good 
success probabilities, negative reevaluations due to slow development might disrupt 
cooperation.  
Perceptions of fairness and venture progress also change over time and have varying 
effects on the cooperation between small university spin-offs and their large university 
partners (Feldman et al. 2002, Sommer and Loch 2009). Although we know that perceived 
fairness increases cooperation and related performance, it remains unclear how fairness 
perceptions change over time and thereby vary in their effects on cooperation and 
performance. Our detailed study of fairness perceptions and cooperation dynamics aims to 
reveal the mechanisms underlying these interactions and create insights for managing them.  
Accordingly, in Figure 1 we integrate these research findings and display the role of 
fairness perceptions and subsequent entrepreneurial cooperation in three partly overlapping 
adjustment, reevaluation, and learning cycles (cf. Ariño and De la Torre 1998, Doz 1996). 
Existing literature treats these three cycles as separate mechanisms; we instead stress their 
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cumulative and reinforcing nature by conceptualizing them as partly embedded causal loops. 
All the relationships in Figure 1 are positive. In the adjustment cycle (light grey arrows), 
accumulated experience affects both performance and perceived performance, which initiates 
a positive change in fairness perceptions. Perceived fairness exerts a positive effect on 
cooperative behavior, which influences the pace of key startup and commercialization events. 
This execution of startup events then increases experience, which closes the adjustment cycle. 
The reevaluation cycle (dark grey arrows) is partly embedded therein but includes a direct 
effect of the pace of startup events on perceived performance. That is, as more key startup 
events get executed, more progress is made, and the perceived performance of the venture 
improves, which triggers an increase in fairness perceptions and then results in increased 
cooperation. Finally, in the learning cycle (black arrows), the execution of startup events 
leads to increased experience, which directly affects cooperative behavior and then influences 
the pace of events.  
------ Insert Figure 1 about here -------- 
3. Empirical Cooperation Patterns 
3.1. Empirical Data and Analysis 
The empirical data that inform our model pertain to new ventures commercializing 
technology from Eindhoven University of Technology in The Netherlands. This university 
stimulates the creation of new ventures proactively, with the goal of commercializing 
university inventions, so it has established various procedures and rules to guide new 
venturing processes, such as norms for the negotiation process and standard agreements 
between the university and entrepreneurs. These rules attempt to create smooth 
commercialization processes by preventing extended negotiations and establishing 
expectations for the inventors and (future) entrepreneurs. 
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 We selected a sample of 17 new ventures begun by academic entrepreneurs from the 
database maintained by the technology transfer office (TTO) at the university, in consultation 
with the TTO staff. The sample features theoretically relevant differences, including the 
industry targeted, the academic or industry experience of the entrepreneurs, and the success 
of the venture. Yet, the small sample enables our in-depth comparison of each case and 
examination of its cooperative dynamics (cf. Eisenhardt 1989, Lichtenstein et al. 2006, Van 
de Ven and Engleman 2004).  
 The data came from two main sources: (1) open-ended interviews with the entrepreneurs 
and university officials and (2) archival data. We conducted 29 face-to-face interviews with 
the lead founders, as well as 13 interviews with university and TTO officials, which we used 
to discern the institutional environment of the university. All interviews were recorded and 
fully transcribed. The archival data sources included company-related documents and 
performance data, such as business plans and annual reports, as well as contracts with the 
companies. We also collected newspaper articles, interviews, brochures, and online 
information about the companies.  
 Our analyses of the interviews with the academic entrepreneurs enabled us to identify the 
key startup and commercialization events. We employed the coding technique developed by 
Van de Ven and Poole (1990) to code events that must occur for a venture to become an 
independent and viable company (Lichtenstein et al. 2007). The key events include filing the 
first patent, registering the company, signing the contract with the university, starting 
production, acquiring investments, and establishing an agreement with a first client. We also 
coded context characteristics, including market complexity (i.e., volatility and market 
response), and individual-level characteristics, such as experience. We coded the four 
dimensions of fairness perceptions (Colquitt 2001), but they all had similar effects on 
cooperation, so we proceeded with a single, overall fairness construct. Two coders, 
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unfamiliar with the study, confirmed the reliability of the final coding. We then triangulated 
the interview codes with other data sources, such as e-mail conversations and press releases.  
 Next, we created and analyzed graphical representations of the event series, including the 
time between events, for each of the 17 cases, to identify any differences in the venture 
startup patterns (Langley 1999). We then related the identified cooperation patterns and their 
underlying events with the coded fairness perceptions, contextual characteristics, and 
individual-level conditions. By using the throughput time of events, we established a 
relationship among fairness perceptions, cooperative behavior, and venture performance in 
terms of progress.  
3.2. Empirical Findings  
Our empirical analysis reveals three cooperation and new venture development patterns, each 
of which includes two phases of interaction. For example, the unfair–fair pattern indicates 
that the entrepreneur initially perceived the relationship as unfair but then grew to regard it as 
fair. Two key differences in venture and context characteristics influenced these fairness 
perceptions and thus the cooperation patterns: the degree of initial experience possessed by 
the entrepreneur (low or high) and the complexity of the market in which the entrepreneur 
operates (low or high). Combining these two differences result in four possible patterns, but 
we empirically observed only three (see Table 1). The fourth possible pattern thus appears 
unusual; it does not emerge in any of our 17 cases. In Figure 2 we depict the accumulation of 
startup and commercialization events as a function of time for each of the three empirically 
observed patterns. Higher curves indicate that the events accumulated quickly. As more key 
startup events occur within a particular time period, venturing progress increases in speed.  
------ Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here -------- 
 
 The first pattern, which we call steady development (fair–fair), features startup events 
that occur faster than in the other two observed patterns. For example, the establishment of 
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the legal entity and strategic cooperation with external parties both start early, and 
entrepreneurs perceive the university’s procedures and policies, as well as the (negotiation) 
behavior exhibited by its representatives, as consistently fair. As one founder noted, “It is 
especially important that we found something that was satisfactory to everybody.... They may 
get their 200K [in royalties]. That’s quite easy, also because it is favorable for both parties. 
When the university sees something coming back, we will probably get more from them as 
well.” That is, cooperation with the university appears essential for the venture’s 
development, so the entrepreneurs work hard to maintain good working relationships. 
Another founder explained, “I prefer to be embedded within the research group. That I could 
talk with researchers at the coffee table. That’s of much value for me.” The ventures 
following this pattern in turn show steady development and continuous growth; the critical 
events in their development curves are the filing of their first patent and the start of 
production. Their markets exhibit relatively low complexity and volatility. Finally, an 
essential condition is the degree of (market and entrepreneurial) experience of the founders, 
which emerges in their fairness evaluations: “We just make agreements in conformance with 
market standards. That is the most effective deal.”  
 In the second pattern, increased cooperation (unfair–fair), the entrepreneur requires 
significantly more time to complete key startup events. In particular, the first five startup 
events take significantly more time than in the steady development pattern, but over time, the 
pace increases. Initially entrepreneurs perceive the relationship as unfair, such that “The TTO 
director says: if a spin-off earns twenty Ferrari’s, we would like to get one as well.… But he 
wanted to have 15% [of the shares], that makes it three Ferraris! Then, I start thinking: that’s 
just unfair.” This perception reflects the power imbalance between the entrepreneur and the 
university: “You easily get screwed. The university has the most powerful position.” It also 
slows progress in negotiations, which spills over to affect other startup events. For example, 
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ventures often need IP agreements with the university to attract investments. However, soon 
after they finalize these negotiations, fairness perceptions turn more positive. Entrepreneurs 
learn to perceive the agreement and relationship as fair, so they increase their cooperation 
with the university, and venture development progresses at a moderate pace (i.e., increasing 
slope after month 18 in Figure 2). As an important individual-level condition, these 
entrepreneurs (mostly doctoral students or recent graduates) appear relatively inexperienced. 
Their changing perceptions, cooperation, and performance indicate their learning curves, as 
one founder reflected in a second interview, just after he had finished negotiations: “We were 
maybe a bit naive in the beginning.… More experience would definitely have helped.… The 
most important difference is: we were quite negative in the beginning and now we’re more 
positive.” As the surrounding market has relatively low complexity, this pattern allows for 
learning time, because there is no need for quick action to meet changing customer 
preferences or to deal with changing competitive landscape. Yet their minimal experience 
causes entrepreneurs to perceive even these markets, with their relatively low complexity, as 
difficult, which helps explain why the initial events take so much time. 
  Finally, in the decreased development pattern (fair–unfair), entrepreneurs initially 
develop the venture quickly and in close cooperation with the university after a short period 
of negotiations. In the first phase, the entrepreneurs perceive the university’s rules and 
behavior as fair, but by the second or third investment round, their perceptions begin to 
change, and they regard their previous agreement and renegotiations as unfair. Therefore, 
they decrease their cooperation with the university, because they believe, for example, “The 
average VC [venture capitalist] does not ask so many clauses as the university.... The 
approach is: as the university gets such a percentage for actually nothing, what should I tell 
this VC three months later? That the company’s value has increased twenty times? That 
doesn’t work. It is just not correct.” The specific events surrounding changing perceptions 
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suggest that (re)negotiations often take place in difficult market circumstances, such as a lack 
of positive responses from customers or industry crises. When they reduce their cooperation, 
the entrepreneurs must find “better” partners, which delays the commercialization process. 
This pattern is common among founders with substantial business experience, who 
experience the university environment as “not professional” or lacking in “business-like 
manners.” Yet their experience also seems to prevent them from learning from the changing 
circumstances to achieve fruitful interactions with the university. 
4. Model Description 
Some patterns are more likely to be delayed, but a simple explanation that relies solely on 
high market complexity and low experience is insufficient. For example, we find a mixture of 
quick and delayed venture development in two patterns (see Table 1), which implies the need 
for insights in dynamic patterns. Accordingly, we develop a system dynamics (SD) model 
that describes the complex interrelationships of new venturing processes, fairness 
perceptions, entrepreneurial experience, and cooperation dynamics. This method can analyze 
situations that involve multiple and interacting processes, delays, accumulations, and other 
nonlinear effects, such as feedback loops and thresholds (Davis et al. 2007, Bendoly et al. 
2010), and it appears extensively in prior research (e.g., Akkermans and Vos 2003, Croson 
and Donohue 2006, Garcia et al. 2003, Georgiadis et al. 2009, Größler et al. 2008, Oliva and 
Sterman 2001, Repenning and Sterman 2002). Also entrepreneurship researchers have started 
to use SD modeling, to describe venture development from opportunity identification to exit 
(Yearworth 2010), to explore the effects of e-commerce strategies (Bianchi and Bivona 
2002), and to understand the growth of biotech start-ups (Grossmann 2003). Our SD model 
extends this literature by developing and simulating a model of the cooperation dynamics of 
entrepreneurial firms and by using a modeling approach that not only uses empirically 
grounded results (see Yearworth 2010) but also combines these results with literature based 
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relationships. The key concepts of our SD model are based on our literature review (see 
Figure 1), though the model behavior and the value of the exogenous variables are based on 
our empirical analysis (see Table 1). Thus, our empirically grounded model provides a logical 
and coherent explanation of interrelationships and resulting multi-ordered dynamics of the 
different processes. We provide a full description of the model, including model equations 
and the values of the exogenous variables, in a separate model documentation appendix, 
available upon request.  
4.1. Main Model Equations 
We provide a stylized version of the simulation model in Figure 3, which contains three 
reinforcing cycles: adjustment, reevaluation, and learning. For clarity, we detail the model in 
the reverse sequence, starting with the shortest (i.e., learning) cycle (black arrows in Figure 
3).  
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ------- 
4.1.1. Modeling the Learning Cycle 
The learning cycle begins with the execution of the startup and commercialization events 
(lower left corner, Figure 3). The event execution rate (eer) refers to the number of startup 
events executed per month; it implies the flow from events that are currently being 
undertaken, or Events in Execution (EiE), to the stock of completed or Executed Events (EE). 
Initially of course, the EiE stock is full, because all the events have yet to be executed. The 
EE stock contains a single event: the invention. As the cooperation progresses, more events 
get executed, EiE is depleted, and EE increases (Equation 1). As our empirical observations 
show a  total number of 16 unique startup events per case, EE will never rise above 16. To 
measure eer, we multiply the number of startup events in execution (EiE) by the degree of 
cooperative behavior (CB) (Equation 2). Thus as CB increases, eer increases, because more 
cooperative behavior should shorten the event execution time (eet) (Equation 3). Thus, 
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 Every executed event also adds to the entrepreneur’s accumulated experience. Therefore, 
eer directly influences the experience rate (iex) (Equation 4). However, experience could 
decrease if an entrepreneur forgets about past events (dex). Therefore, to determine the 
relative experience of an entrepreneur, compared with the experience possessed by other 
entrepreneurs (relEx) (Equation 5), we measure the ratio of Experience with Events (ExE) to 
a reference level of experience (refEx). This reference level equals the maximum experience 
an entrepreneur can attain in this industry, ranging from 0 (no experience) to 1 (maximum 
experience). Thus,  
 , and  (4) 
 . (5) 
 We also recognize that more relative experience (relEx) should reduce the execution 
time, because according to learning curve theory, productivity rises by a given percentage as 
experience levels increase (Sterman 2000; see also Lapré et al. 2000, Wiersma 2007). We 
define the productivity increase that results from learning in our study as a lead-time based on 
learning (ll) construct:  
  . (6) 
We designate the normal lead-time (nl) as equal to the shortest event lead-time, which occurs 
when the entrepreneur has maximum experience. Across industries, lead-times fall by 10% to 
30% with twice the amount of cumulative experience (Sterman 2000). However, our modeled 
process is not very repetitive, so we assume that smaller lead-time reductions result from 
adding experience. Specifically, for every doubling of ExE, we assume ll declines by 10%, so 
eer EiE 
dt 
d 
eer EE 
dt 
d 
       and   
CB EiE eer   
eet 
CB 
1 
 
dex eer dex iex ExE 
dt 
d 
    
refEx 
ExE 
relEx  
elc relEx nl mcf ll    
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the exponent of the learning curve (elc) equals –0.15. This constant exponent describes the 
strength of the learning curve; because it is negative, a higher level of relative experience 
induces a shorter lead-time based on learning. Finally, ll should be positively influenced by a 
constant that represents the market complexity factor (mcf). At the same experience level, ll 
should be longer in complex rather than simple markets.  
 Beyond the learning effect, the time needed to execute an event (eet) depends on 
perceived fairness (PF): 
 . (7) 
That is, if an entrepreneur perceives higher fairness, the time needed to execute an event 
should be shorter. This reduced time then leads to cooperative behavior (CB), which closes 
the learning cycle. Thus the learning loop has two negative links: between relative experience 
and lead-times based on learning, and between event execution time and cooperative 
behavior. The even number of negative links implies positive, or reinforcing, overall behavior 
of the loop.  
4.1.2. Modeling the Reevaluation Cycle 
In the reevaluation cycle (dark grey arrows, Figure 3), the number of executed startup events 
(EE) determines the progress of the venture (pv), which in turn influences its perceived 
performance, according to the entrepreneur (PP). The progress of the venture is measured by 
comparing the actual progress in terms of EE with the planned progress. When the actual 
progress falls behind the expected schedule, pv decreases. Because perception changes take 
time, we model PP as an adaptive expectation; it gradually adjusts to the actual progress of 
the venture (Sterman 2000) through changes in perceived performance (cPP). Initially the 
entrepreneur has difficulty assessing venture performance, because few events have been 
executed. Thus perceived performance initially depends on the entrepreneur’s relative 
experience (relEx). Over time, more events get executed, and PP is increasingly influenced 
PF ll eet /  
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by venture progress, so we predict that the weight of experience (we) decreases over time 
(from 1 to 0). In terms of our causal loops, this means that in the beginning the adjustment-
loop (with relEx) and the learning-loop are the drivers of the model’s behavior. Over time, 
the influence of relEx decreases because we decreases and as a result the reevaluation-loop 
(with pv) and the learning-loop will determine model behavior. The time required to adjust 
PP (perceptions) to actual values (determined by pv, relEx, and we) then depends on the 
perception adjustment time (pat): 
 . (8) 
Performance perceptions also directly influence perceived fairness (PF), again as an adaptive 
expectation: It takes time before the entrepreneur recognizes performance, so PF lags PP by 
a certain time (pat): 
 . (9) 
The reevaluation cycle continues from PF to eet, CB, eer, EE, pv, and cPP—relationships 
that we described previously, so we refer readers back to Equations 1–8 for their 
explanations.  
4.1.3. Modeling the Adjustment Cycle 
Finally, the adjustment cycle (light grey arrows, Figure 3) starts with the rate at which events 
get executed; continues with increasing experience, perceived performance, perceived 
fairness, and event execution time; and closes with the impact of cooperative behavior on the 
event execution rate. See Equations 1–9.  
4.2. Settings and Model Fit 
Our empirical results show that particular combinations of experience and market complexity 
produce three patterns in real-world alliances (see Table 1):  
pat 
pv we relEx we PP 
PP 
dt 
d 
cPP 
) ) 1 ( (       
  
pat 
PP PF 
PF 
dt 
d 
cPF 
  
  
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● Steady development (fair–fair). The fixed pace at which events are executed results in 
quick venture development (high experience, low complexity). 
● Increased cooperation (unfair–fair). The event execution rate is slow at first but then 
speeds up (low experience, low complexity). 
● Decreased cooperation (fair–unfair). The fast event execution rate in the beginning 
eventually slows down (high experience, high complexity). 
Although we did not observe the fourth possible pattern in our empirical analysis, we 
consider it for theoretical completeness, namely,  
● Unstable development (unfair–unfair). Events are executed slowly, both at first and in the 
end (low experience, high complexity). 
 For each pattern, we use our SD model to recognize the feedback mechanisms and 
reinforcing causal loops that drive them. To ensure that we can replicate actual behaviors 
with our model, we assess its performance statistically through a comparison with our 
empirical data pertaining to executed events, or EE (available for the first three scenarios). 
The comparison is based on Theil’s inequality statistics (Figure 4, Panel B), such that we can 
evaluate the fit between actual (Figure 2) and simulated (Figure 4, Panel A) EE behavior 
(Sterman 2000). Specifically, we divide the root mean square error into three components: 
bias (i.e., actual and simulated data have different means), unequal variation (actual and 
simulated data have different variances), and unequal covariation (actual and simulated data 
are imperfectly correlated). If the error is small and unsystematic (concentrated in unequal 
variation or covariation), the model can endogenously generate the behavior that marks the 
observed system (Sterman 1984).  
 We find a good fit between actual and simulated behavior (Sterman 2000). In general, 
the errors are concentrated in unequal variation or covariation. Although the bias associated 
with the increased cooperation pattern is somewhat large (0.45), the bias is nearly zero for the 
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other patterns, which implies the former value is probably due to acceptable assumptions that 
do not compromise the model as such (Sterman 1984). The graphs in Figure 4, Panel A, also 
confirm the robustness of our results. That is, differences are relatively small between the 
simulated increased and decreased cooperation patterns, but the crucial patterns emerge. For 
example, in the simulated decreased cooperation pattern (black solid line, Figure 4, Panel A), 
the number of initially executed events is slightly higher than the number in the increased 
cooperation pattern (dark grey solid line), which implies a higher event execution rate. Then 
after month 26, the situation reverses.  
 With Figure 5, we undertake a visual inspection of the effects of fairness perceptions. 
Although we lack time-series data regarding perceived fairness behavior (PF), quotes from 
our interviews reflected fairness perceptions in all three scenarios, including changes over 
time, so we expect simulated PF to reflect these quotes. According to Figure 5, Panel A, the 
model simulation attains satisfactory results that align with the empirical data: Fairness is 
always high (≥0.5) in the steady development pattern, grows in the increased cooperation 
pattern, declines in the decreased cooperation pattern, and is always low (<0.5) in the 
hypothetical unsteady development pattern. 
----- Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here ------- 
5. Model Results: Four Cooperation Patterns 
From our theoretical model derived from prior literature (Figure 1) and our simulation model 
based on our empirical study (Figure 2), we derive a narrative to explain how the cooperation 
between an entrepreneur (small partner) and a university (large partner) unfolds.  
5.1. Steady Development Pattern (Fair–Fair) 
In this scenario, a relatively experienced entrepreneur starts to commercialize a university-
owned technology through a new venture in a market with minimal complexity. The 
entrepreneur has started ventures before and knows what to expect from the university; 
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expectations about the time needed to execute all necessary events also are reasonable. The 
entrepreneur’s initial expectation is that the negotiations will be fair (light grey solid line, 
Figure 5, Panel A), and this positive perception smoothes communication processes and 
cooperative behavior, which shortens the event execution time (Figure 5, Panel B) and speeds 
up the event execution rate. As more events get executed, the entrepreneur’s experience 
steadily increases (Figure 5, Panel C), and through this learning curve, execution time per 
event falls (Figure 5, Panel B). Then the reinforcing loop with increased fairness perceptions 
(Figure 4, Panel A) leads to even more effective cooperation and further reductions in event 
execution time. The venture performance is consistently good (Figure 5, Panel D) and 
fairness perceptions persist throughout the process (Figure 5, Panel A).  
5.2. Increased Cooperation Pattern (Unfair–Fair) 
When a relatively inexperienced entrepreneur wants to start commercializing a university 
technology in a market with relatively low complexity, his or her lack of experience (dark 
grey solid line, Figure 5, Panel C) exaggerates the power imbalance with the large university 
and thus creates low initial fairness perceptions (Figure 5, Panel A). In turn, these 
inexperienced entrepreneurs are reluctant to cooperate, so communication and cooperation 
take more time and lengthen the event execution time (Figure 5, Panel B). However, the 
relative simplicity of the market still allows events to be executed, so the progress of the 
venture never falls below 75% (Figure 5, Panel D). Furthermore, because the entrepreneur is 
at the start of a learning curve, every event makes a high marginal contribution to his or her 
experience level (Figure 5, Panel C). After executing about half of the necessary events, the 
learning effects come into play; the turning point after 8 of the 16 start-up events is based on 
our empirical study. We find that reaching a final agreement with the university about IP 
(which is the ninth event, on average) prompts a shift in fairness perceptions. The augmented 
learning thus increases fairness perceptions (Figure 5, Panel A), ensures cooperative 
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behavior, and shortens event execution time (Figure 5, Panel B), which advances the 
venture’s progress (Figure 5, Panel D). 
5.3. Decreased Cooperation Pattern (Fair–Unfair) 
In this scenario, an experienced entrepreneur enters a relatively complex market with a 
university-owned technology. This entrepreneur is very optimistic: Having started new 
ventures successfully before, why should this one fail? Initially then, the fairness of the 
interactions with the university seems high (black solid line, Figure 5, Panel A). However, the 
complexity of the selected market creates some problems, leading to longer than expected 
event execution times (Figure 5, Panel B) and a sense of stagnation in perceived progress 
(Figure 5, Panel D). Because the entrepreneur has already reached the end of his or her 
learning curve, experience increases minimally (Figure 5, Panel C), so new events have 
limited influence on event execution time, which barely gets reduced at all during the process 
(Figure 5, Panel B). Progress falls farther and farther behind the intended schedule, and the 
entrepreneur starts to regard the process as inflexible and unfair. The cycle grows vicious: 
Lower perceived fairness increases event execution time, which reduces progress and 
decreases perceived fairness even more. 
The behavior of this pattern (first fairness increases and later it decreases) deserves some 
clarification as only reinforcing loops drive this behavior. The lack of venture progress in the 
beginning of the decreased cooperation pattern only has a minor effect on Perceived 
Performance (PP) as a result of the relatively large weight of experience (we). As a result, in 
the beginning the adjustment-loop dominates and all variables in this loop are increasing. 
Although pv is quite low, an increasing relEx does compensate for this effect, leading to an 
overall positive effect on PP. However, we decreases over time and the reevaluation-loop 
becomes stronger over time, which causes that the decreasing venture progress influences PP 
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negatively. Even though the actual progress (in terms of EE) can be increasing, there is a 
negative effect on pv as long as the actual progress is below the planned progress. 
5.4. Unsteady Cooperation Pattern (Unfair–Unfair) 
We imagine, in this hypothetical pattern, that an inexperienced entrepreneur starts to 
commercialize university-owned technology in a highly complex market. Low initial fairness 
perceptions (black dotted line, Figure 5, Panel A) and high market complexity induce a long 
initial event execution time (Figure 5, Panel B). The slow progress barely adds to the 
entrepreneur’s experience; after week 26, the time needed to execute an event becomes so 
long that the entrepreneur even starts to forget, leading to reduced experience (Figure 5, Panel 
C). We observe another vicious cycle: Long event execution times lead to a minor increase in 
experience, which results in little learning and slower progress, which negatively affect 
perceived fairness and thereby increases event execution time even more. 
As this unsteady development pattern was not validated by our case study due to a lack of 
empirical observations of this pattern, we analyzed the pattern by sensitivity analyses. We 
tested the robustness of the pattern by changing the values of two exogenous variables. Our 
analyses show that the pattern is robust to these changes (see the model documentation 
appendix).  
5.5. Intervention Scenarios: From Vicious to Virtuous Cycles 
How can ventures in these latter two deteriorating patterns possibly succeed? Our SD model 
enables us to explore whether it is possible to turn vicious cycles into virtuous ones. Of the 
various interventions possible—such as hiring technology transfer officers with more 
expertise (Lockett and Wright 2005), shifting to a less complex market, or adapting the 
business model (Degroof and Roberts 2004)—we consider the option of adding experienced 
entrepreneurs to the venturing team (Franklin et al. 2001). We model such additions as a 
sudden increase of entrepreneurial experience (ExE) at different points in time, namely, at 6, 
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12, 18, and 24 months. For each time, we determine the minimum amount of extra experience 
needed to halt the vicious cycle, increase cooperation, and enhance venture progress.  
----- Insert Figure 6 about here ------- 
 We show the results of these interventions in Figure 6. Specifically, in Panel A, we find 
that it is possible to halt the vicious cycle in the decreased cooperation pattern by involving 
an experienced entrepreneur, but the amount of extra experience required grows 
exponentially over time. In month 6, adding 8 events to the stock of experience (ExE) is 
sufficient to turn the collaboration into a positive interaction. Our reference experience level 
(refEx) is set to 100 events, so the addition implies involving another experienced 
entrepreneur for only 8% of the week. In month 24 though, the necessary experience jumps to 
274 events—equivalent to adding almost three, full-time, experienced entrepreneurs. Panel B 
indicates that halting the hypothetical unsteady development pattern would be even more 
difficult: At month 6, we would need an extra experience of 43 events to turn the 
collaboration into a positive interaction. By month 12, this intervention can no longer 
succeed, regardless of how much experience the venturing team adds, and the vicious circle 
becomes inescapable.  
6. Discussion  
The SD model, which extends existing literature and is based on empirical data, reveals 
interactions over time among feedback mechanisms and causal loops: the accumulation or 
loss of entrepreneurial experience (mediated by a learning curve), changing fairness 
perceptions, increased or decreased cooperation, and venture development (which is 
associated with venture success, Lichtenstein et al. 2007). In contrast, existing literature on 
university spin-offs and entrepreneurial cooperation has primarily studied cooperation from a 
cross-sectional perspective (Lichtenstein et al. 2007, Reuer et al. 2006, Rothaermel et al. 
2007) and therefore cannot offer detailed explanations for why some cooperation processes 
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are more or less difficult (cf. Müller 2010). Unlike most interfirm collaborations, 
entrepreneurs face significant uncertainty and must deal with individual-level fairness 
perceptions when they ally with universities—features that are hard to manage with 
standardized contracts and procedures (Shane 2004, Sommer and Loch 2009). We contribute 
to extant literature by providing a causal, dynamic understanding of how changing fairness 
perceptions influence entrepreneurial cooperation and technology commercialization 
processes. In particular, we show that no single critical event triggers increased or decreased 
cooperation; rather, it depends on learning effects and initial levels of and increasing 
entrepreneurial experience. Each identified cooperation patterns thus has implications for 
research, as well as important insights for practitioners, who should take individual-level 
perceptions and experiences of the entrepreneurs into account when managing such 
relationships.  
 The steady development pattern (fair–fair) exemplifies the reinforcing effect of 
experience, fair perceptions, effective cooperation, and smooth technology commercialization 
processes. Most studies imply this pattern: A high degree of relevant experience leads to high 
degrees of perceived fairness (Müller 2010), better cooperation, and more successful 
venturing (Grandi and Grimaldi 2005, Lee and Tsang 2001, McGee et al. 1995). However, 
our study also reveals that the experience effect is dynamic and cumulative, such that more 
relevant experiences and positive learning improve cooperation. In a practical sense, 
venturing teams should aim to include experienced entrepreneurs, who can smooth the 
process, especially if they have cooperated with the focal university before.  
 The increased cooperation (unfair–fair) pattern offers a new finding by showing that a 
difficult start and unfavorable initial conditions (inexperienced, unfair perceptions) do not 
necessarily lead to poor performance in the long run. The learning curve effect means that not 
only are initial conditions important, but learning capacity has a key influence as well (e.g., 
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Doz 1996). Therefore, university representatives and inexperienced entrepreneurs should take 
care to recognize the effects of fairness perceptions on the degree of cooperation and 
venturing progress. Such perceptions might be improved through the careful management of 
expectations, communication, and procedural consistency. Furthermore, inexperienced 
academic entrepreneurs should pursue opportunities to learn and adapt their perceptions; 
TTO managers similarly should try to provide learning experiences outside the university.  
 The decreased cooperation (fair–unfair) pattern indicates an experience trap effect 
(Sengupta et al. 2008). Experienced entrepreneurs think that they have “seen that, done that” 
and thus may fail to understand the importance of cooperation or have difficulty adapting to 
new circumstances (Shepherd et al. 2003). Because external changes in the market or 
industry likely create a need for contractual renegotiations (Ariño and De la Torre 1998, Doz 
1996, Reuer et al. 2002), entrepreneurs must be prepared to adapt to changes, without 
minimizing beneficial cooperation efforts. Those entrepreneurs who terminate their 
relationship with the university during renegotiations, especially in the context of difficult 
market circumstances, are more likely to enter a vicious cycle in which their uncooperative 
behavior is detrimental to venture progress. The failed learning mechanism also might 
explain Ariño et al.’s (2008) observation that small firms are less likely to change their 
contracts when collaborative interactions result in governance misalignment. For technology 
commercialization, experienced entrepreneurs thus should be aware of the trade-off 
associated with their experience, such that they run the risk of lost flexibility (Dane 2010). 
Our intervention scenarios note the possibility of halting the vicious circle of decreased 
cooperation through the early involvement of an extra entrepreneur or multiple experienced 
team members, but to avoid an even deeper experience trap, those additional members should 
have experiences that differ from those of the existing team. The collaboration also ultimately 
includes two parties, so another possible intervention would be to add skilled people to the 
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TTO staff (Lockett and Wright 2005), which may ensure that entrepreneurs receive enough 
learning time or help to address market complexity. 
 Finally, the unsteady cooperation (unfair–unfair) pattern reveals that cooperation and 
venture progress are likely poor in difficult commercialization settings, featuring 
inexperienced entrepreneurs who are unable or unwilling to learn. Most entrepreneurship 
studies are biased toward successful entities, because unsuccessful cases are difficult to 
sample (Davidsson 2004); our well-supported model shows that in this hypothetical scenario, 
learning through the commercialization process becomes a vicious cycle, and hindered 
progress is the outcome. For inexperienced entrepreneurs who want to start commercializing 
in such conditions, our results are discouraging, because they suggest the project is very 
likely to fail. Only by involving an experienced entrepreneur early in the process can this 
unsteady cooperation pattern shift into a positive interaction (Franklin et al. 2001, Mosey and 
Wright 2007). Although we did not model alternative intervention scenarios in this case, it 
may help to combine multiple interventions, such as adding skilled TTO staff, changing the 
business model, and adding team members with specific market knowledge (cf. Van Burg et 
al. 2008). Furthermore, our sensitivity analyses indicated that a less ambitious planning of the 
venture could also yield positive results.  
Beyond these implications, this study suffers from some limitations that offer 
recommendations for research. First, our study’s empirical data include only a small sample 
of high-tech companies affiliated with a single university. The external validity of the 
empirical findings and the model calibration are well supported in this domain but not 
necessarily beyond it. Second, we used an overall construct of fairness perceptions. 
Analyzing the dynamics across different dimensions could reveal interesting internal 
dynamics (Ariño and Ring 2010). Third, the nature of our empirical data does not allow for 
real-time or close to real-time analyses. The granularity of the events therefore refers to 
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weeks and months rather than days or hours. Closer observations of commercialization 
processes and cooperation might reveal more sophisticated patterns (e.g., fair–unfair–fair) 
and more information to calibrate the model. Fourth, our findings indicate that even 
experienced entrepreneurs can have difficulties setting up a venture in complex markets. 
They know how to set up a venture; they just do not have enough knowledge about the 
complex market they are trying to serve. This finding implies the potential for two types of 
learning curves: one for learning how to set up a venture, and one for learning how to operate 
in a complex market. Further research should address the differences in these learning curves 
and their individual and combined effects on the venture start-up process.  
7. Conclusions 
This study describes and simulates the commercialization process of a university-owned 
technology by a new venture. The model outlines the effects of accumulated experience, as 
well as the results in terms of perception changes and cooperative behavior. We thus 
contribute to a better understanding of the effects of entrepreneurs’ experience and fairness 
perceptions on their cooperative behavior, opening the “black box” surrounding the role that 
such perceptions play in technology commercialization processes. If they understand the 
dynamics associated with this cooperative behavior, managers of technology 
commercialization and entrepreneurs can gain a better sense of how to ensure effective and 
cooperative behaviors.  
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Figure 1: Cooperation Dynamics Model 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Number of Actual Executed Events 
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Figure 3: Stylized Model 
 
Stock: accumulation that characterizes the state of the system
Flow: rate in which material (or information) flows into or out of a stock
Valve: regulator of the flow
Source: stock outside model boundary
Arrow (dashed): causal relationship between an exogenous variable (constant) and an endogenous variable (a leads to b)
Arrow (solid): causal relationship between two endogenous variables (b leads to c)
Positive causal relationship: when the cause increases (decreases) the effect will also increase (decrease)
Negative causal relationship: when the cause increases (decreases) the effect will decrease (increase)
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Table 1 
Cooperation Patterns  
 
 
 
Initial Experience  
 Low High 
Market  
Complexity  
 
Low 
 
Increased cooperation 
(unfair–fair) 
6 cases; 1 delayed 
 
Steady development  
(fair–fair) 
7 cases; all on time 
 
High Unsteady development  
(unfair–unfair) 
(not empirically observed
1
) 
Decreased cooperation 
(fair–unfair) 
4 cases; 3 delayed 
 
1
This pattern is not empirically observed but represents a theoretical extrapolation from the findings from the 
17 cases (Section 4.2).  
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Figure 4 
Fit Between Actual and Simulated Executed Events 
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Figure 5 
Dynamic Behavior of Four Cooperation Patterns 
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Figure 6 
From Vicious to Virtuous Cycles  
6A. Decreased Cooperation Pattern (Fair–Unfair) 
  
 
6B. Unsteady Development Pattern (Unfair–Unfair) 
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Model documentation accompanying the paper: 
Elco van Burg & Kim E. van Oorschot, “Cooperate to Commercialize 
Technology: A Dynamic Model of Fairness Perceptions, Experience, and 
Cooperation”, Production and Operations Management.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The full simulation model is shown in Figure A. At the core of the model are the three 
reinforcing cycles of adjustment, reevaluation, and learning. For clarification reasons we will 
explain our model in the reversed sequence, starting with the shortest cycle (the learning 
cycle, depicted with the black arrows in Figure A).  
 
 
 
Figure A: Full System Dynamics Model of Fairness Perceptions, Experience, and 
Cooperation 
 
2. Modeling the Learning Cycle 
 
We start the formalization of the learning cycle at the lower left corner of Figure A: the 
process of executing startup and commercialization events. The execution of the 16 most 
frequent startup and technology commercialization events (total startup events, TE, see 
equation 1) that were identified in the process study is represented by three stocks, as shown 
in Figure A. When the partners start with an event (event start rate, esr), this single event 
flows from Events to be Executed (EtbE) (equation 2) to the stock of Events in Execution 
(EiE). This esr is influenced by the time required to start an event (tts) (equation 3 and 4). 
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TE = 16 (1) 
esrEtbE
dt
d
  (2) 
),min( eer
tts
EtbE
esr   (3) 
 tts = 1 (4) 
The event execution rate (eer) denotes the number of startup events that is executed per 
month, which is simulated as a flow of events from the stock Events in Execution (EiE) to the 
stock Executed Events (EE). As more events are executed, the stock EiE is depleted and the 
stock of EE is filled (equation 5 and 6). Every time one event is finished, another one is 
started (denoted by the arrow from eer to esr) (see equation 3). The eer is determined by the 
number of startup events in execution (EiE) and the degree of cooperative behavior (CB) 
(equation 7). CB is linked to the event execution time (eet) (equation 8). As such, a shorter 
eet results in more CB. 
eeresrEiE
dt
d
  (5) 
 
eerEE
dt
d
  (6)
 
CBEiEeer   (7) 
 eet
CB
1

 (8) 
Initially (at t = 0), 14 out of the 16 events are in the stock of Events to be Executed (EtbE) 
(equation 9), and the stocks EiE and EE both contain only one event. For EE this is the actual 
invention to be commercialized (equation 11), for EiE this is the next event (following the 
invention) both partners are jointly working on (equation 10). 
 
EtbE(0)= TE-EiE(0)-EE(0)  (9) 
EiE(0) = 1 (10) 
 EE(0) = 1 (11) 
Note that the total number of startup events (TE) eventually limits the event execution rate. 
Because TE is 16, no more than 16 events can be executed. When 16 events are executed (EE 
= 16), the venture process is finished. Therefore, EE can never rise above 16, and for 
successful ventures, graphs of EE showing the behavior over time will always flatten after 16 
events have been executed.  
 
Every event that is executed increases the accumulated experience of the entrepreneur. 
Therefore, the eer directly influences the increase rate of experience (iex) (equation 12). 
Experience might decrease though if the entrepreneur starts to forget past events (dex). This 
situation occurs when the time between events is very long. Then, the events that happened a 
long time ago are not part of the working memory of the entrepreneur (short-term memory, 
stm) and the information needs to be recalled, repeated, re-discussed, and so on, which 
increases the time required for the next event. As long as the time between events is shorter 
than the stm, there is no forgetting. When the time between events is longer than the stm, the 
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entrepreneur starts to forget some of his/her previous experiences. The rate at which the 
experience decreases is defined by the long-term memory (ltm) (equation 13).  
dexeerdexiexExE
dt
d
  (12) 
dex = IF (eet>stm) THEN (ExE/ltm) ELSE (0) (13) 
stm = 6 (14) 
ltm = 12 (15) 
To determine the relative experience of an entrepreneur compared to other entrepreneurs 
(relEx), we consider the ratio of ExE and the reference experience (refEx) (equation 16), 
which indicates the maximum level of experience the entrepreneur can attain in this industry 
(equation 17). As such, relEx is expressed as a number between 0 and 1, such that 0 indicates 
being highly inexperienced and 1 is highly experienced. 
 
refEx
ExE
relEx   (16) 
 refEx = 100 (17) 
Finally, we define an initial value of ExE according to the relative experience of the 
entrepreneur at the start of new venture process (relEx(0), see equation 18). We distinguish 
two situations: the entrepreneur is initially inexperienced or the entrepreneur is initially 
experienced:  
 
refExrelExExE  )0()0(  (18) 
relEx(0) = 0.4 (for an inexperienced entrepreneur) (19) 
relEx(0) = 0.6 (for an experienced entrepreneur)` (20) 
Higher relEx results in decreased event execution time, via the learning curve (equation 21). 
Learning curve theory posits that productivity rises by a given percentage with each doubling 
of the level of experience (Sterman 2000: 507, see also Lapré et al. 2000, Wiersma 2007). 
The productivity increase through this learning curve is defined as leadtime based on learning 
(ll): 
 
 elcrelExnlmcfll   (21) 
 nl = 2 (22) 
 elc = -0.15 (23) 
where normal leadtime (nl) is the shortest leadtime that can be attained at the reference 
experience level in a very complex market. Reductions of, in this case leadtimes, of 10% to 
30% per doubling of cumulative experience have been documented in various industries 
(Sterman 2000). Because we do not model a process with highly repetitive activities, we 
assume that reductions in our case fall at the lower end of the spectrum, or 10%. For every 
doubling of ExE, the ll declines by approximately 10%. This 10% reduction corresponds with 
a value of the exponent of the learning curve (elc) of -0.15 (equation 23). The elc is a 
constant that describes the strength of the learning curve. Because the exponent of the 
learning curve (elc) is negative, higher relEx implies a shorter leadtime based on learning (ll). 
Figure B shows the relationship between ExE and ll, in which the 10% reduction is realized 
when the exponent of the learning curve (elc) is -0.15. 
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Figure B: Leadtime based on learning (ll) as a function of Experience (ExE) 
 
In addition to experience, ll is also positively influenced by a constant, the market complexity 
factor (mcf). This mcf defines the complexity level of the market in which the new venture 
will operate. The lower the mcf the ‘easier’ (e.g., in terms of high predictability, low 
diversity, low volatility, etc.) the market is. Thus, at the same level of experience, ll is longer 
in complex markets as opposed to easier markets. Two situations are distinguished here: a 
situation in which market complexity is low and one in which market complexity is high:   
 
mcf = 0.50 (for a low market complexity) (24) 
mcf = 0.75 (for a high market complexity) (25) 
Besides the learning effect, the time needed to execute an event (eet), is also affected by the 
perceived fairness (PF) of the entrepreneur. 
     
 PFlleet / . (26) 
This equation shows that higher perceived fairness (PF) shortens the time needed to execute 
an event (eet). Subsequently, the eet feeds back into the cooperative behavior (CB), which 
closes the learning cycle (see equation 8). 
 
 
3. Modeling the Reevaluation Cycle 
 
The reevaluation cycle is depicted with the dark grey arrows in Figure A. The number of 
executed startup events (EE) allows the entrepreneur to perceive the progress of the venture 
(pv), which changes the perceived performance of the venture (PP). Because changes in 
perception take some time, it is modeled as an adaptive expectation that gradually adjusts to 
the actual value of the variable (Sterman 2000), via the change in Perceived Performance 
(cPP) (equation 27). The actual value of the variable is determined by pv. In the beginning, 
however, it is difficult for the entrepreneur to adequately assess venture performance based 
on the small number of executed events. When the entrepreneur is experienced, he or she 
should be more optimistic about the performance of the venture (“I have done this before, I 
know what I am doing, and I will be successful”), which indicates a higher PP. When the 
entrepreneur is inexperienced, the performance likely seems low in the beginning (“I don’t 
know how this works, I don’t know if I am doing this right, and maybe others are much better 
at this”). Therefore, we assume that in the beginning, performance depends on relEx, but after 
more events get executed, PP is influenced more by pv. This shift in impact is determined by 
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the weight of experience (we). This we is defined as a non-linear decreasing function (Effect 
2, Ef2) of time (t), starting at 1 and decreasing to 0 (see equation 29 and 30). The time 
required to adjust the PP (the perception) to the actual value (determined by pv, relEx, and 
we) is determined by the perception adjustment time (pat), which is equal to 2 months 
(equation 31): 
pat
pvwerelExwePP
cPPPP
dt
d ))1(( 
  (27) 
pvwerelExwePP  )1()0(  (28) 
we = Ef2(t) (29) 
Ef2 > 0, Ef2’ < 0, Ef2’’ < 0, Ef2(0)=1, Ef2(7)=0.98, Ef2(22)=0.32, Ef2(32)=0 (30) 
pat = 2 (31) 
The influence of relEx on PP decreases over time (because we decreases) and after month 20, 
pv is the most dominant factor to determine PP. In terms of our causal loops, this means that 
in the beginning the adjustment-loop (with relEx) and the learning-loop are the drivers of 
system behavior. Over time, the influence of relEx decreases (because we decreases), causing 
the reevaluation (with pv) and the learning-loop to determine the model behavior. 
 
The progress of the venture (pv) is determined by the relative progress (rpv) and schedule 
pressure (sp) (equation 32). The rpv is the number of events that are actually executed (EE) 
compared to the number of events that are expected to be executed, based on the time that has 
elapsed (t) and the expected leadtime of each event (el) (see equation 33).  
  
)(1 spEfrpvpv   (32) 
))0(,min()( executed events ofnumber  planned
)( executed events ofnumber  actual
EE
el
tTE
EE
PEE
EE
rpv
t
t
t


 
(33) 
This equation shows that EE is positively related to rpv. The more events are executed 
(higher EE), the higher the relative progress of a venture (rpv). However, because time (t) is 
in the denominator of the equation, the elapsed time has a negative effect on the rpv. The 
more time has elapsed, the higher the value of t, which can potentially reduce rpv. When the 
actual progress cannot keep up with the planned progress, rpv can decrease if EE is not 
increasing sufficiently. 
 
Schedule pressure (sp) is defined as the ratio of time required to execute all remaining events 
and the time remaining to do all these events (equation 34). Schedule pressure (sp) affects pv 
through the function Effect 1 (Ef1). Ef1 is modeled as a non-linear decreasing function of sp. 
When, for example, 75% of the events have been executed (rpv = 0.75) in almost 100% of the 
planned time, there is significant schedule pressure to finish the last 25% of the events on 
time. Because of this high schedule pressure, the perceived progress of the venture (pv) is 
much lower than the 75%, which is determined by Ef1 (equation 35). As such, sp behaves as 
a multiplier. When events are executed according to plan (or even ahead of plan), sp ≤ 1, and 
the Ef1(sp) = 1. When the number of executed events is lower than planned, sp will be larger 
than 1, and Ef1 will be lower than 1, thereby decreasing the perceived progress of the 
venture. Because sp is a multiplier, it can strengthen the negative effect of rpv, but it will not 
make a negative effect of rpv positive. 
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telTE
elEETE
sp



)(
remaining time
required time
 (34) 
 Ef1 > 0, Ef1’ < 0, Ef1’’ < 0, Ef1(0)=1, Ef1(1)=1, Ef1(2)=0.5, Ef1(5)=0.1 (35) 
PP directly influences the perceived fairness (PF) (equation 36). PF is also modeled as an 
adaptive expectation: it takes some time before the entrepreneur internalizes the performance, 
so PF lags PP by a certain time (pat): 
 
 
pat
PPPF
PF
dt
d
cPF

 . (36) 
We assume that PF can be quantified as a number between 0 and 1, in which 0 indicates that 
the entrepreneur perceives total unfairness and 1 denotes high fairness perception. The initial 
PF (PF(0)) is determined by the initial relative experience (relEx(0)), which is also expressed 
as a number between 0 and 1. 
  
PF(0) = relEx(0) = 0.4 (for an inexperienced entrepreneur)  (37) 
PF(0) = relEx(0) = 0.6 (for an experienced entrepreneur)  
Thus, based on the empirical observations, we model that an inexperienced entrepreneur 
begins the venture processes with a relatively low perceived fairness, and an experienced 
entrepreneur will start these processes with a relatively high perceived fairness. 
 
The reevaluation cycle continues from PF to eet, CB, eer, EE, pv, and cPP. Because these 
relationships have been described already, it suffices here to refer to respectively equations 
26, 8, 7, 6, 32, and 27.  
 
 
4. Modeling the Adjustment Cycle 
 
The adjustment cycle is reflected by the light grey arrows in Figure A. Starting at the 
execution of events, the cycle continues with experience increase, perceived performance, 
perceived fairness, event execution time, and the cycle closes with the impact of cooperative 
behavior on the event execution rate. Because all of these relationships have been defined in 
the previous sections, we limit ourselves here to referring to the equations described in 
Section 2 and 3. 
 
 
5. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Our fourth pattern, the unsteady development pattern (unfair-unfair) was not validated by our 
case study (due to a lack of empirical observations of this pattern), but appeared as a logical 
possibility during our simulations. To analyze the sensitivity of this pattern to values of the 
exogeneous variables, we have done two sensitivity analyses: 
1) changing the expected leadtime, which determines the planned number of events executed; 
2) changing the weight of experience, which determines when the dominance of the 
adjustment-loop switches over to the reevaluation-loop.   
 
5.1 Sensitivity analysis of expected leadtime (el) 
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As we explained earlier, the progress of the venture is determined by the expected leadtime, 
the lead time that the entrepreneur perceives as normal. Based on this leadtime, the 
entrepreneur determines or plans what a normal venture progress is. When progress keeps up 
with this plan, the progress of the venture is good (not decreasing), when progress falls 
behind this plan, progress is perceived as bad (decreasing). Obviously, if the plan is less 
ambitious (e.g., if the entrepreneur expects that it takes longer than 2 months to execute an 
event), we would expect more ventures in a complex market to succeed, just because the 
entrepreneur still perceives the performance as increasing (which has a positive influence on 
perceived fairness and cooperation through the reevaluation loop). On the other hand, if the 
plan is more ambitious (e.g., if the entrepreneur expects that it takes less than 2 months to 
execute an event) we would expect less ventures to succeed, because the entrepreneur 
perceives the performance as decreasing (which has a negative influence on perceived 
fairness and cooperation through the reevaluation loop). Therefore, we have varied the value 
of the expected leadtime from 0.25 to 4 months (with steps of 0.25) to see how this influences 
the results. We have depicted the effects of varying the expected leadtime on the number of 
executed events (EE), perceived fairness (PF) and relative progress of the venture (rpv) in 
Figure C. The dotted lines in Figure C denote the original pattern (in which the expected 
leadtime is 2 months).  
 
Figure C shows that indeed, with less ambitious planning (longer expected leadtimes) the 
vicious cycles in the unsteady development pattern can be turned around into virtuous cycles. 
If the expected leadtime is at least 2.75 months (38% longer than in the original pattern), the 
low relative progress of the venture in the beginning will be defeated and later, sufficient 
progress will be made to catch up on the initial delays. If the expected leadtime is shorter than 
2.75 months, the initial unfair situation may improve a little in the beginning, but it will 
decrease and become even more unfair in the end. In other words, our modeled system is 
sensitive to changes in the expected leadtime. However, the expected leadtime has to increase 
with 38% compared to the case-based leadtime values before the behavior of the unsteady 
development pattern fundamentally changes (before unfair-unfair becomes unfair-fair). So, a 
venture process that in the original pattern was planned to take 32 months (16 events, 2 
months per event), would have to be replanned to 44 months (+38%) to change the unfair 
process to a fair process. Because this is a rather large step (adding one year to a 2.67 year-
plan), we believe that the unsteady development pattern is modeled in a realistic way. 
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Figure C: Sensitivity analysis of expected leadtime (el). The graphs on top of each figure reflect the situation in 
which el = 4 months, the lowest graph reflects the situation in which el = 0.5 months 
 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis of weight of experience (we) 
As we have explained earlier, the weight of experience determines to what extent the 
Perceived Performance (PP) is determined by the relative experience of the entrepreneur 
(relEx) and by the progress of the venture (pv) (equation 28): 
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pvwerelExwePP  )1(
 
 
Based on our case study material, we is defined as a non-linear decreasing function (Ef2) of 
time (t), starting at 1 and decreasing to 0, as shown in Figure D. 
 
 
Figure D: Weight of experience as a non-linear decreasing function of time 
 
Changing the shape of this function changes the way PP is determined, and as a result it may 
change the unsteady development pattern. Therefore we also have performed a sensitivity 
analysis of we. Obviously, there are many ways to change the curve of  Figure D. It can be 
shifted to the left or right, squeezed, flipped horizontally and vertically, et cetera. In order to 
limit the multitude of options we decided to change the weight of experience curve into a 
linear curve and to let the curve shift from being monotonic decreasing to monotonic 
increasing, to get a good impression of the influence of the values of we on the simulation 
results (note that this also includes the possibility of having a constant value of 0.5). Figure E 
shows the different values we have used in this sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity results are 
shown in Figure F. 
 
 
Figure E: Different weights used in the sensitivity analysis (the original weight is showed with a dashed line) 
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Figure F: Sensitivity analysis of weight of experience (we). The graphs on top of each figure reflect the situation 
in which we is low in the beginning and high in the end. 
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Figure F shows that if experience is given a different weight in determining PP, it can 
influence the unsteady development pattern in such a way that the unfair perceptions turn into 
almost stable fair perceptions. These are the situations in which the weight of experience is 
extremely low in the beginning and extremely high in the end. As Figure F shows, there is 
one situation in which the unsteady development pattern (unfair-unfair) ends with fair 
perceptions and in which all 16 events are executed, and one situation in which this pattern 
ends with almost fair perceptions (close to 0.5) and in which 15 events got executed. These 
two situations have a weight of experience in the beginning of respectively 0 and 0.1 (and 
consequently in the end the weight is 1 and 0.9). These results do not suggest that it is better 
to have no experience in the beginning, but that it would be better not to take this experience 
into account when assessing the performance of the venture. However, it seems hard or even 
almost impossible to change the subconscious cognitive effects of past experiences, in 
particular the effect of successful experiences (Burmeister and Schade 2007, Ucbasaran et al. 
2003, Busenitz and Barney 1997). Therefore we believe that the unsteady development 
pattern is robust to changes in the weight of experience and that this pattern could be a 
realistic pattern.  
 
What we can learn from the two sensitivity analyses is that if there is a way to turn the unfair-
unfair situation around, it is by less ambitious planning and by ignoring previous experience 
when assessing the preliminary performance in a new venture. It is as if the entrepreneur 
should start with a clean sheet, no plans, no expectations. In theory, if the stock of 
experiences in the human mind could be ‘emptied’ this could work, but it also has the danger 
of never-ending ventures that do not fail, but also never get anywhere.  
 
 
6. Exogenous Variables 
 
An overview of the values of all these exogenous variables appears in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Values of Exogenous Variables 
Variable Description Value Units 
 
TE Total startup events 16 events 
tts Time to start an event 1 month 
EiE(0) Initial events in execution 1 event 
EE(0) Initial executed events 1 event 
stm Short-term memory 6 months 
ltm Long-term memory 12 months 
refEx Reference experience 100 events 
relEx Relative experience 0.4 or 0.6* dimensionless 
el Expected leadtime 2 months 
nl Normal leadtime 2 months 
elc Exponent learning curve -0.15 dimensionless 
mcf Market complexity factor 0.5 or 0.75** dimensionless 
pat Perception adjustment time 2 months 
    
* 0.4 for an inexperienced entrepreneur, 0.6 for an experienced entrepreneur. 
** 0.5 for a low complexity market, 0.75 for a high complexity market. 
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